- metadata: - source: https://compactmag.com/article/woke-ism-is-winding-down - people: [[Christian Parenti]] > Please support independent journalism by subscribing to [Compact Magazine](https://compactmag.com/about/) ---  Illustration: Scott Menchin Beginning in 2011, there was a rapid shift in the ways people associated with the knowledge economy talked about “social justice” and engaged with “social justice” issues. Professionals in fields like tech, finance, education, journalism, arts, entertainment, design, and consulting (and students who aspired to join their ranks) grew much more politically “radical” over the last 10 years, and increasingly intolerant of dissent. The shifts were especially pronounced on matters pertaining to identity (above all, race, gender, and sexuality). Much of the public discussion of the “Great Awokening” has focused on “vibes” and unrepresentative anecdotes. However, as I illustrate in my [forthcoming book](https://musaalgharbi.com/2021/05/05/book-announcement-we-have-never-been-woke/), it’s possible to measure the changes that have taken place among knowledge professionals in a more systematic way. More recently, though, many of the same types of data that help substantiate the significant transformation in discourse and norms that took place after 2011 suggest that the “Great Awokening” has run its course. From 2011 on, there was a notable surge in protest activity, concentrated in knowledge-economy hubs and driven by knowledge-economy professionals, beginning with Occupy Wall Street, continuing through the anti-Trump `#Resistance`, and culminating with the 2020 turmoil following the murder of George Floyd in Minneapolis. There was significant unrest within knowledge-economy institutions, as well. This entailed campaigns to get people fired for saying the wrong thing, holding the wrong views, or minor behavioral infractions. There also arose internal movements demanding that knowledge-economy affiliated institutions issue strong statements on contentious political issues, donate to activist organizations, expand diversity initiatives, and so on. Leaders often acceded to these demands with little questioning or resistance. There were also significant changes to outputs produced by knowledge-economy professionals. [Print and television media](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/08944393211031452), [academic scholarship](https://www.nas.org/academic-questions/35/2/themes-in-academic-literature-prejudice-and-social-justice), and books all became far more preoccupied with various forms of prejudice, discrimination, and inequality. “It became difficult to produce and distribute work that failed to toe the prescribed line.” Artistic creation followed the same path. Even before the election of Donald Trump, art had grown [increasingly political](https://newrepublic.com/article/118958/liberals-are-killing-art-insisting-its-always-political) since 2010. After 2016, political art became the only kind that seemed to “[matter](https://www.vulture.com/2017/04/is-political-art-the-only-art-that-matters-now.html).” It became difficult to produce and distribute work that failed to toe the prescribed line or conform with the newly imposed norms and expectations on social and political issues; if such work did make it past the protestations of progressive staffers, it often faced cancellation campaigns after the fact. Finally, there were major changes in expressed attitudes on contentious topics, and in the political alignment and behavior of knowledge-economy workers. Most knowledge-economy professionals in the United States are highly educated whites who self-identify as liberal. Polls and surveys show that, after 2011, there was a marked shift in how [highly educated white liberals](https://musaalgharbi.com/2020/12/15/great-awokening-racial-realities/) responded to questions related to identity issues: To wit, they became significantly more likely to strike the maximally “left” posture on such questions. Whites affiliated with knowledge-economy fields also became much more likely to [self-identify as “liberal” and to vote for the Democratic Party](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n7yC8zmIJnU) over the past decade. This, in turn, significantly reshaped the party’s priorities and rhetoric, often [alienating](https://theintercept.com/2021/11/15/democrats-voters-virginia-glenn-youngkin/) nonwhite, less educated, and less affluent voters. It’s been ten straight years of heightened unrest in knowledge-economy institutions and knowledge-economy hubs. However, the wave has now begun to crest. We can see this in polls and surveys. White liberals, the Americans whose expressed views shifted most radically over the last decade, have begun to moderate their responses to questions, for instance, about the causes and ideal remedies to racial inequalities. There have been shifts in the ways people identify themselves, too. For instance, polling and surveys suggest that “feminist” and related labels seem to have lost some of their luster in recent years, including (and perhaps especially) among young people. Data on media outputs and “cancel-culture” incidents [also suggest](https://twitter.com/epkaufm/status/1613151599475494912) that a corner may have been turned. Across a range of datasets, we see apparent declines in “grassroots” attempts to censor uncomfortable speech on campus (even as there are growing attempts to [suppress political scholarship](https://www.propublica.org/article/desantis-critical-race-theory-florida-college-professors) from external stakeholders). Media discussion of various forms of prejudice and discrimination also seem to have declined significantly over the last year. Within the Democratic Party, following [anemic 2020 results](https://musaalgharbi.com/2020/11/13/biden-weak-electoral-mandate/) and [recalls](https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2022/10/19/ruy-teixeira-asks-whether-america-has-reached-peak-woke) of progressive politicians in blue states, there have been efforts to “course correct,” to avoid further alienating normie voters. The Democratic base has moved in a similar direction, broadly rejecting progressive candidates during the 2022 primaries. These countermeasures likely helped the party stave off the anticipated “red wave,” preventing extreme Republican candidates from facing Democratic challengers who were also perceived to be far out of step with mainstream America. Running moderate Democratic candidates against GOP extremists [proved to be a winning move](https://musaalgharbi.com/2022/11/30/2022-midterms-false-narratives/) throughout the country in 2022. “Many are coming to find the culture wars both unsatisfying and rote.” And yes, there are also “the vibes.” According to [some accounts](https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/josephbernstein/peter-thiel-anti-woke-film-festival-trevor-bazile), there is a growing appetite among Generation Z for humor and subversion, for a slackening of constraints and an expansion of horizons. The heavy moralizing around identity issues, the constant and intense surveillance and management of self and others, the incessant calls for revolution and reform—these elements of woke culture are running up against a growing sense of nihilism and ironic detachment among young adults. There is growing discussion of a “[vibe shift](https://www.thecut.com/2022/02/a-vibe-shift-is-coming.html)” among Millennials as well. Many are coming to find the culture wars both unsatisfying and rote. They are exhausted by the relentless cynicism, fear, doomsaying, and impression management that have governed much of their lives—and for what? They recognize the revolution isn’t coming anytime soon. So they are looking instead to have fun, relax, and cut loose a bit. Or, at the very least, to stop having to be so neurotic, guarded, and paranoid. Perhaps responding to these changes, multinational corporations are reevaluating their position in the culture wars as well, often at the expense of employees who had come to view their employers as reliable allies in their campaigns to push progressive values. “Corporations are reevaluating their position in the culture wars.” Companies are slackening their enforcement of post-2010 norms and expectations on identity issues. For instance, they are [growing less likely](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/24/business/media/hollywood-metoo.html) to rapidly terminate or suspend employees accused of sexual misconduct based purely on the word of accusers. At the same time, they are walking back their aggressive symbolic commitments to social justice and [quietly defunding](https://www.essence.com/news/money-career/tech-companies-quietly-defunding-diversity-pledges/) the financial pledges they made to various activist groups and causes. Many are also making [aggressive cuts](https://adage.com/article/marketing-news-strategy/twitter-meta-big-tech-layoffs-threaten-dei-jobs-progress/2465206) to the DEI-related positions that ballooned in recent years. Rather than rapidly caving to employee “social-justice” demands, as they had for much of the last decade, managers at knowledge-economy institutions are increasingly trying to reassert their authority, [firing employees](https://www.politico.com/news/2022/06/09/felicia-sonmez-fired-by-the-washington-post-00038622) who attempt smear campaigns against colleagues and the companies they work for, and [imposing new rules](https://www.semafor.com/article/10/18/2022/inside-the-identity-crisis-at-the-new-york-times) on how internal workplace channels are used. When workers at Netflix attempted to cancel Dave Chappelle in late 2021, the company didn’t respond by issuing apologies and promising more programming on LGBTQ topics, as it had in the past. Instead, executives issued a [memo](https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10813409/Netflix-tells-staff-LEAVE-theyre-offended-content.html) informing protesting employees that if they weren’t open to publishing content they disagree with, they should quit. When an insufficient number of activist employees took them up on this invitation, the company proceeded with aggressive cuts apparently [targeting these employees](https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10837347/Netflix-layoffs-hit-staff-working-original-content-marginalized-communities.html) and the programming they worked on. At Disney, following the [box office failures](https://nypost.com/2022/12/01/after-disneys-strange-world-bombs-film-critic-says-go-woke-go-broke/) of a number of high-profile movies promoting LGBT relationships—alongside a series of [p.r. controversies](https://nypost.com/2022/03/30/disney-executive-wants-more-lgbtqia-minority-character/) related to Disney’s advocacy for the LGBT cause that culminated in bids by lawmakers to strip the company of its [special governing and tax-exempt status](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-61179262) in Florida—CEO Bob Chapek was ousted. Reinstated, ex-CEO Bob Iger immediately struck a more conciliatory tone on the culture wars, acknowledging that Disney and its employees have particular values and tastes that they are passionate about folding into Disney content, but also [emphasizing](https://www.foxbusiness.com/media/disney-ceo-bob-iger-tells-employees-wants-quiet-culture-wars-respect-audience), “When you tell stories, there’s a delicate balance. You’re talking to an audience, but it’s also important to listen to an audience. It's important to have respect for the people you are serving, that you are trying to reach, and not have disdain for them.” More recently, social-media companies like [Twitter](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/nov/24/elon-musk-offers-general-amnesty-to-suspended-twitter-accounts) and [Meta](https://www.politico.com/news/2023/01/25/meta-to-reinstate-donald-trumps-facebook-account-00079537) have moved to reinstate the accounts of Donald Trump and other controversial right-aligned personalities, generally against the preferences of their overwhelmingly left-aligned employees. Across the board, employers seem to feel less social pressure to conspicuously conform with demands made in the name of social justice. Instead, executives seem to feel increasing social permission to marginalize, censor, or purge activist employees in order to shore up their own authority and enhance the bottom line. Whether any of these developments are “good” or “bad” will ultimately be a matter of perspective. The matter of _fact_ is that, for better or worse (or more likely, a [bit of both](https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2023/03/france-tocqueville-democracy-race-le-wokisme/672775/)), the post-2011 “Great Awokening” seems like it might be winding down. What its legacy will be is yet to be determined. [Musa al-Gharbi](https://musaalgharbi.com/) is a Paul F. Lazarsfeld Fellow in Sociology at Columbia University and a Daniel Bell Research Fellow at Heterodox Academy. ###### Related Articles